Introduction
... the medical educator the emotions are not novel. The seeming inability of a resident to deal with a medical moral dilemma is distressing, but for a medical student to come through two rigorous years of training in medicine, only to discover that the hours spent in the cadaver lab or the histology library or the lecture hall were poor background for the actual practice ofmedicine, is not only disturbing, it is close to negligent. More importantly, it is avoidable. The purpose of the present paper is, first, to point to the need for ethical and humanitarian education in medical schools, and, second, to describe the structure and empirically demonstrated effectiveness of a course designed to meet this need.
Teaching medical ethics
The field of medical ethics has been growing steadily, and is no longer the exclusive province of educators with medical degrees. Philosophers, ethicists, psychologists, and other professionals have lent their expertise to the problem of educating the humanist physician. However, their suggestions have not met with overwhelming receptivity. In the Journal of medical education, Keyes, et al.3, offered this information: although close to go per cent of the Council of Deans of Medical Schools supported the concept of greater exposure of medical students to the behavioural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities, the probability of this change occurring was seen as slim. Others have noted this serious deficiency in medical education (eg, Reynolds and Catson4). Maddison' observed that to fail to include the medical humanities would be to fail in the 'central task of medical education'. Towers has questioned whether American medical schools are even teaching clinical judgement. Another critic, Abrahamson7, has identified nine 'diseases of the curriculum', including, for example, 'curriculum hypertrophy' (described as 'a curriculum increasingly crowded as more and more content gets crammed into limited time spaces') and 'intercurrent curriculitis' ('a reflection of the incompatibility or unresponsiveness of the curriculum to concurrent societal problems'.) Thus, we can see that not only are students concerned about the flaws in their training, but the educators themselves are troubled.
Although there is no one solution to the problems in medical education, there has been a movement Teaching medical ethics: the cognitive-developmental approach I71 toward the establishment of a branch of studies known as medical humanities. This broad category includes courses in medical ethics, as have been described in this journal in the past few years (eg, Jones and Metcalfe8; Dennis and Hall"; Clarke'0), as well as courses similar to the one described by Moore" in The New England Journal of Medicine, in which the medical writings of authors such as Virginia Woolf, Andre Gide, Thomas Mann, and Thomas de Quincey were utilised in discussions ranging from 'Attitudes toward medical studentship' and 'The experience of illness' to 'The ethical landscape'. The need for courses such as Moore's, and the course to be described in this report, can easily be seen in the medical education literature. We can no longer deny the disillusionment and cynicism that develops in medical students as their professional training proceeds. Nor can we deny that the medical school graduate is rarely trained to deal with the difficult moral dilemmas confronting the field of medicine as a whole. STUDENT DISILLUSIONMENT A recent study of the 'process of disillusionment' in medical students concluded that there was a discernible pattern of discontent, both with the process of medical education and medicine in general, which occurs in the last two years of medical school. The students identified as the more susceptible to this disillusionment are those with a greater proclivity for the literary and the artistic (Schwartz, et al.'2) . That this type of student should be in greater jeopardy of losing enthusiasm for the practice of medicine is in opposition to the celebrated ideal of the 'humanist physician', the kind of physician that some feel our medical schools should be producing (Pellegrino'3; Naughton'4). Boyle and Coomb'5 found that students who brought. 'romantic expectations' about the medical profession and its training methods into their first year had greater stress in coping with that crucial first year; a similar conclusion was reached by Gottheil, et al.'6. Studies of the concerns and views of first-year students are quite prevalent, yet all seem to centre on the same problems and conceptions. This is rather disquieting, as the literature on the medical student seems to centre repeatedly on these same problems (eg, in I962-65 (Bloom'7), I968-69 (Rosenberg'8), and I974 (Baird'9) ). Again and again we are told that students lose their lofty ideals about medicine, undergoing a process which forces them to develop a new self-image while under stresses of numerous varieties and intensities. Funkenstein's20 extensive analysis of medical schools yielded a list of stresses that are most often experienced by medical students, and are the most harmful: difficulties in orienting to the medical school environment; marked sense of competition; scarcity of leisure time; loss of close relationships with faculty members; decline in the calibre of teaching; problem of challenge and response; lack of relevance; conflicting demands; anachronistic skills and values; prolonged dependency; financing a medical education'.
It is quite possible that some of the current problems in medical education may be endemic to any system of medical education that could be instituted. However, the lack of relevance that students see in their education can be minimised, if not eradicated. Ours is not the first study to examine the methods of inculcating human values into medical education. Kepler and Saslow21 examined the changes in attitude the medical student can undergo after a course in human values, and their conclusions, though cautious, are encouraging. They felt that the participating students may have been made more aware of the humanistic values in medicine, and at the same time experiencing a decrease in the rate of the inevitable progress of cynicism. Rosenberg and Weber22, in a related study, examined the results of curriculum change at the University of Minnesota Medical School. Under the 'new' curriculum, ranking and grades were eliminated, behavioural sciences were taught in lectures and small-group discussions, and more clinical experience and patient contact were given to the entering student. Their results showed an elimination of the tension and anxiety about the competitiveness, inflexibility, demand for strict memorisation, and questionable relevance of the 'old' curriculum. Additionally, for students tested in both their freshman and sophomore years, it was found that the 'new' curriculum students' scores on the Humanitarianism Scale didn't decline significantly, while the 'old' curriculum students' scores did. However, students in both the 'new' and the 'old' curricula were stressed in emotionally-charged situations like death23.
PROFESSIONAL SOCIALISATION
Perhaps the optimal method of arousing medical students' awareness of the great moral burden that any physician bears is a four-year emphasis on what the student should expect to find upon entering the hospital world as full physician. No single course, no matter how effective, could compete with the guidance of medical students by their clinical and basic science professors (through both example and discussion). However, if this has, in fact, been taking place, the literature would not display such extensive discontent on the parts of both educators and those being educated.
The influence of professional socialisation in the making of the physician cannot be overestimated. Shuval24, in her research at The Hebrew University of Jersualem, uncovered the dual nature of the professional socialisation process. At one end of the spectrum lies the 'boy' syndrome, in which the medical student is pushed backward into the traditional role of the student, while at the other end lies the awarding of 'junior colleague' status. The latter orientation is a forward push in which the student is forced to adopt the professional role. The four main agents of socialisation, according to Shuval, are the physician-teachers, other hospital personnel (including nurses and technicians), patients, and student peers. All four exert varying levels of influence, although the physician-teachers' intensity of push in either direction is seen as depending on the specific atmosphere and status hierarchy of the particular medical school. The students themselves seem to exert a powerful social control, as they determine the rate at which they and their peers can legitimately adopt the professional role. Although she offers no definitive conclusions, Shuval feels that early acceptance of the professional role (namely, in the first two years) would allow for easier transition into the period of clinical training.
Other studies have pinpointed student dissatisfaction with the 'boy' role. Forty-seven per cent of students responding to a questionnaire about problems and concerns at the University of Colorado School of Medicine were 'significantly concerned' about 'feeling dehumanised', while 34 per cent resented 'being treated as though you were immature and irresponsible' (Edwards and Zimet25). Students at the Bowman Gray School of Medicine, when asked for sources of the stress they felt during their freshman year, selected 'long term conflict over being in a dependent, helpless role' as an important concern (Boyles and Coombs26). Rosenberg27 found that the undermining of the student self-image was in part caused by students' not being 'prepared to be at the bottom of a tall, formally hierarchical ladder, with time from senior staff for questions a privilege rather than a right, teaching assistants from non-medical disciplines who made them feel like second class citizens in that discipline, and head nurses who turned them away from operating rooms, delivery rooms, and sometimes even autopsies with, "You're just a freshman".' This uncertainty about self was found by Schwartz, Schwartzburg, Lieb, and Slaby28 at the Yale University School of Medicine. Over two-thirds (69 per cent) of the afore-mentioned artistically and literarily inclined medical students (the A-L group; see Note I2) and 39 per cent ofthe more scientifically and professionally oriented students (the P-S group) expressed feelings of depersonalisation and altered self-image. The results of these studies, and others not cited here, point to one conclusion: the medical student, from the first day of medical school, wants to be considered a 'junior colleague', not treated as a 'boy'.
The great impact that either orientation has on a medical school student body was dramatically shown by Bloom in his noted study of The State Certainly, there are areas in the training of even first-year students in which the junior colleague status so strongly desired by the student can, and perhaps should, be accorded without threat to the medical educator. In particular, this greater equality of status ought to be achieved in the more philosophically-oriented pursuit of ethical traininglargely because of the lack of hard-and-fast rules to guide one in the resolution of ethical dilemmas. Rather, the sharing and testing of ideas and logical approaches calls for an open and 'safe' atmosphere -one in which ascribed status is not only irrelevant but inappropriate.
A course in medical ethical reasoning In this section of the paper, we will discuss the design and empirically demonstrated effectiveness of a course in ethical (or moral) reasoning intended for use by pre-medical and medical school students. We have utilised techniques from the fields of moral development and moral education, course material from the realms of literature, film, and philosophy, and the ancient Socratic educational style found in the discussion seminar. What makes this experiment unique in the field of medical humanities and medical ethics lies in its philosophical and psychological bases -the theory of the development of moral reasoning pioneered by Dr Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard University.
While other courses or programmes have been utilised in the effort to train students of medicine to deal more effectively with the myriad moral and humanistic dilemmas facing both the individual physician and the field of medicine as a whole, the present course was unique in at least one major respect: it was based in a systematic body of psychological and educational theory and in philosophical rationale. This characteristic of the course provides several advantages. First, the course was designed not on the basis of speculation as to what might be reasonable goals and an effective technique of instruction; rather, we drew heavily from an already substantial literature in both the theory and technique of moral education. Second, the theoretical basis of the course provided a cohesiveness to the programme of instruction in that all activity was goal-oriented; this included selection of materials, organisation of class activities, role of the instructor, evaluation of student performance, etc. And third, a clear mechanism was provided for evaluating the effectiveness of the course, both in terms of assessment devices and standards of evaluation.
THE KOHLBERG APPROACH TO MORAL DEVELOPMENT Lawrence Kohlberg, of the School of Education and the Center for Moral Education at Harvard University, has spent the past twenty years developing and testing a theory of moral development and education.30 This theory is heavily based in Jean Piaget's3l pioneering theories of the development in children of both logical reasoning skills (in general) and moral reasoning skills (in particular). This cognitive-developmental approach to moral development has several basic and important characteristics; space limitations permit us only to mention these briefly. First, the emphasis is on cognition, or thinking, rather than on emotions (as in psychodynamic, or Freudian, theory) or leamed associations (as in behavioural, or Skinnerian, theory). Thus, the focus is on the quality of reasoning and how this becomes more sophisticated with development. Second, this approach distinguishes between the structure of reasoning and its contentie, the interest is in how one arrives at a decision, rather than what the specific decision or opinion might be. By way of analogy, let us consider the computer: our interest is in the development of programs which enable the processing of data, rather than on the particular solutions arrived at by employing the program. A specific moral opinion (eg, 'one should not perform abortions') may be identical for a s-year-old child and a 25-year-old medical student; however, the reasoning processes employed in reaching this solution are likely to be quite different. Third, and perhaps most basic to the cognitive-developmental approach, is the notion of stages in development of reasoning. According in this notion, the development of thinking abilities (both general and moral) occurs in an invariant sequence of stages. Initially, reasoning is simplistic and concrete; it becomes increasingly sophisticated and abstract with development. The later-appearing skills must follow the earlier abilities, as they are hierarchical reorganisations of the earlier skills. Thus, according to this model, more mature reasoning is qualitatively more sophisticated than less-well-developed thought, rather than merely being quantitatively superior.
Analogously, having learned arithmetic, the mastery of calculus requires more than the simple addition of more mathematical facts; it requires a much greater sophistication of logical skills -skills generally not available to the grade-school student.
Thus, the cognitive-developmental psychologist views moral judgement as an ability which differs across individuals as a function of reasoning abilities. These abilities are acquired gradually, throughout childhood and adulthood, and are determined both by general intellectual ability and the quality of the individual's socialisation experiences. One cannot simply teach a 5-year-old a moral perspective which a 25-year-old has mastered only after many years of logical experiences. By way of analogy, the young child hasn't the logical ability to understand (and, hence, no interest in) the notion of social contracts, or the philosophical bases of documents such as the US Constitution. But the young child can appreciate the threat of punishment as the basis for behavioural choice, or the marketplace morality of the exchange of goods or favours. Table I contains a basic description of each of Kohlberg's six stages of moral reasoning, including, for each stage, a brief explanation of what a reasoner at each stage would consider to be morally right, the reasons for doing what is right, and the social perspective of the reasoner. The six stages are divided into three basic levels. Stages i and 2 comprise the pre-conventional level, in which reasoning is limited to following concrete rules backed by power and the threat of punishment. When not prohibited, right behaviour is that which serves one's own interests, or the interests of some other person. Stages 3 and 4 comprise the conventional level, in which what is right is that which conforms to the expectations concerning 'good' behaviour of the larger society or some segment of it (eg, the family or peer group). At this level the reasoner is concerned with upholding societal rules, expectations, and roles, and with social opinion, loyalty, and gaining the approval of others. The highly egoistic orientation of Level I is replaced with subordination to the views of the larger social unit of which one is a member. Stages 5 and 6 comprise the principled (or post-conventional) level, in which what is right is determined on the basis of general or universal human rights, values, or principles which both the society and the individual are obligated to uphold. As a member of society, one has a contract with society to uphold the rights of all members of that society. While rules are seen as necessary, they are viewed as arbitrary; the focus is on the principles of justice upon which rules should be based. In contrast to Level II, social than indoctrination into the fixed conventions of the school, the church, or the nation.' In order to stimulate this movement to a higher level of moral thought, the moral discussion approach places great emphasis on these two actions: i) Arousal of genuine moral conflict, uncertainty, and disagreement about genuinely problematic situations. (In contrast, conventional moral education has stressed adult 'right answers', and reinforcement of the belief that virtue is always rewarded.)
2) The presentation of modes of thought one stage above the child's own. (In contrast, conventional moral education tends to shift between appeals to adult abstractions far above the child's level and appeals to punishment and prudence liable to rejection because they are below the child's level).36
Thus, the format of our course was a discussion seminar led by a trained moral educator, with preand post-course evaluation of the moral orientations of the students. Our aims were simple. Through the presentation of the various roles the physician is forced to play in today's society, and by confronting them with a battery of moral dilemmas that seemed to have no apparent ready solution, and which generated conflicting approaches from the various students, we hoped to stimulate advance in the moral reasoning stages employed by each student. By teaching the structures of reasoning rather than content (specific answers), we hoped the students would acquire skills which would enable them to become more mature and more flexible reasoners, able to respond to the unique qualities of each new situation. This is by no means an easy task; substantial cognitive changes must be made. Stimulation at a level too divergent from that of the student will result in no change. And students in moral education groups will be at several different stages, requiring individualised and differential responses by the leader.
A thorough review of the literature of medical ethics and medical humanities has not revealed any prior research utilising the Kohlberg method of moral education. The only application of the Kohlberg work we have found was a study done by Stevens and Firth37, which involved administering Rest's Defining Issues Test (an objective test of moral judgement) to a group of third-year medical students, and subsequently to a smaller group of psychiatric residents at various stages of their training. The authors concluded that medical moral education could benefit from the use of cognitive developmental approaches such as Kohlberg's. They recommended further research into such applications, as they noted that despite Kohlberg's orientation being used on myriad subject populations, ' it has yet to be applied to the medical profession, although its relevance would seem obvious'.
METHODOLOGY
The participants in this study were I5 Ohio University undergraduates, ranging in age from I8 to 26. Fourteen different majors were represented (including two premedical students; six students were in the Honours Tutorial programme). The course was non-graded, with either credit or no credit given upon completion of the course. There were no exams or papers, although there were two essays assigned for the last two books, due to the discussion leader's discovery that a few of the students were not reading the books carefully enough for discussion. The group met twice weekly in two-hour sessions throughout the ten-week quarter. Since the discussions were based on the readings or the films, the students were left little recourse but to do the reading.38
INSTRUMENTS AND PROCEDURES
At the first and last class sessions, a standardised measure of moral reasoning developed by Kohlberg was administered to all participants for the purpose of determining each individual's pre-and postcourse stage of development of moral reasoning skills (which would additionally permit an objective evaluation of the course's effectiveness). The scoring of moral reasoning protocols was based on Kohlberg's I976 scoring procedures39. The class sessions employed the moral education techniques developed by Blatt and Kohlberg.39 COURSE MATERIAL
The course schedule was planned so that a film, book, or specific moral dilemma was discussed at each session. The books and films were assigned in such a way as to maximise interest, and to expose the students systematically to more difficult dilemmas as the course progressed. In that manner, Bellevue (Don Gold) served as an introduction to the world of the inner-city hospital, while Tender Is The Night (F Scott Fitzgerald), QB VII (Leon Uris), and Arrowsmith (Sinclair Lewis) were employed as portraits of the individual practitioner; all presented moral dilemmas which were discussed at length. The films -The Edelin Conviction (PBS) and abbreviated versions of Abandon Ship, and On The Waterfront -were also quite effective as stimulants to discussion. The dilemmas and topics discussed were myriad, including: the doctor and his feelings about death, the accountability of the physician (specifically Adam Kelno in QB VII), research ethics and the use of a human control group (the Arrowsmith dilemma), the doctor under the law (Kelno and Edelin), the doctor and abortion (Edelin and Bellevue), and the nature of truth (On The Waterfront). However, two discussions stand out as the most profound, and the most troubling -the issue of triage as seen in Abandon Ship, as a lifeboat captain must decide which twelve passengers to throw overboard in order for the others to live, and Albert Camus' The Plague. The course seemed to peak around this book, as the feelings of nihilism and helplessness expressed by some of Bellevue's residents were mirrored in Dr Rieux. The essays that were written about this character were unanimous in their admiration, and many felt he was their idea of the perfect physician. The role of religion in the book and in relation to the physician were discussed, to the initial surprise and eventual satisfaction of the class.
It should be noted that the students were given a fairly extensive introduction to the Kohlberg theory, as we wanted them to be aware of what we were using as the psychological and philosophical bases for the course. They expressed great interest in this approach, and there appeared to be little apprehension about their moral reasoning stages (among other issues discussed, it was carefully explained that while the reasoning employed at higher stages may be more logically sophisticated and comprehensive, there is no inherent greater value in an individual whose stage level is higher than another's).
RESULTS
Of the fifteen students participating in this study, one did not complete the pre-course survey, and two did not complete the post-course survey. Thus, the number of participants in the data pool is twelve. The results of both surveys are shown in Table II . Each subject has four scores for each testing time (T1 = the pre-course survey; T2 = the post-course survey). In our non-graded seminar, the discussion leader and the students are colleagues, as each individual attempts to come to grips with dilemmas that have no clear-cut answers. To foster further the colleague atmosphere, the discussion leader is not a lecturer; this reduces, and perhaps eliminates, the status hierarchy of the traditional basic science course. With the absence of a traditional authority figure, the situation that Schwartz and his fellow researchers described will not exist.12,28 Thus, the A-L medical students are no longer under greater stress than the P-S medical students. In fact, it is conceivable that the traditional situation would be reversed, as the P-S students might find the ambiguity and lack of definite solutions more discomfiting than their A-L counterparts (who have less of a need for structure, for solving a problem by searching until the 'correct' answer is found). This turnabout can be healthy for both types of students by virtue of the discovery that all are on an equal plane when confronted by a moral dilemma. Just as important is the learning of the one 'truth' that our course offers -nothing is certain. One physician feels that this is the central lesson of medical education:
. 
